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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from the trial court's Summary Judgment.

The

Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)j.

The Supreme Court

of the State of Utah has transferred this case to the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4).
Plaintiff, Chance Collar Company,

(herein referred to as

"Chance Collar11) filed this action seeking to obtain possession
of its drill collars.

Defendant, Thompson, alleged that he was a

good faith purchaser of the drill collars and was entitled to
retain possession.

In a companion case, LOR, Inc., vs. Lane

Murray dba Rocky Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No.
12,386, a jury found that Defendant, Thompson, was not a good
faith purchaser, but had committed fraud in acquiring similar
oilfield equipment in the same transaction in which he acquired
Chance

Collar's

drill

collars.

The

trial

court

granted

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment finding that Defendant,
Thompson's,

claim

was

barred

by

the doctrine

of

collateral

estoppel and that Chance Collar was entitled to take possession
of its drill collars.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether

Defendant

is

collaterally

estopped

from

claiming title to Plaintiff's drill collars as a good faith
purchaser when a jury in the LOR case decided that he acquired
1

the drill collars by fraud?
2.

Whether

certified

copies

of

the

pleadings,

jur

instructions and verdict of the LOR case and the fact that Judg<
Davidson presided in the LOR case provided a sufficient record oi
which to base his ruling of collateral estoppel in this case?
3.

Whether Defendant can raise, for the first time oi

appeal, the issue as to whether the record before Judge Davidsoi
was sufficient?
4.

Whether

alleged

disputed

facts,

unrelated

tc

circumstances giving rise to collateral estoppel, prevent entr}
of summary judgment?
STATUTES INVOLVED
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Chance Collar filed this action seeking to recover its drill
collars
acquired

alleging
the

that

drill

Defendant,

collars

Thompson,

in concert with

had

fraudulently

Defendant, Lane

Murray, that any title Defendant, Thompson, had to the drill
collars was voidable and Chance Collar was entitled to recover
its drill collars. (R.22)

Defendant, Thompson, in his Answer,

claimed to be a good faith purchaser of the drill collars and
claimed to have paid value for the drill collars. (R.47)
In a companion case entitled LOR, Inc., vs. Lane Murray dba
Rocky Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 12,386,
2

also filed in Uintah County, Utah, LOR, Inc., (referred to herein
as LOR) also sought to recover possession of its drill collars.
Defendant, Thompson, in the LOR case also claimed that he was a
good

faith purchaser having paid value for the drill collars.

(R.181-193)

The case of LOR, Inc., vs. Lane Murray dba Rocky

Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, was set for a jury trial
beginning March 26, 1985. (R.194)

The Chance Collar Company vs.

Lane Murray dba Rocky Mountain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, was
set for jury trial beginning April 10, 1985. (R.130)
The LOR case was tried, beginning March 26, 1985, before a
jury.

The Judge presiding over the case was Judge Richard C.

Davidson.

The jury was instructed regarding

good

in business

faith

transactions,

the

acquiring title and the elements necessary
purchaser.

fraud, duties of

effect

of

fraud

on

to be a good faith

The jury was then instructed to determine whether

Defendant, Thompson, as a good faith purchaser, owned the drill
collars or whether LOR was entitled to the drill collars (R.199208, Addendum 1)

The jury ruled in favor of LOR (R.196) finding

that Defendant, Thompson, had not acquired the drill collars as a
good faith purchaser but through a fraudulent transaction with
Lane Murray.
Chance Collar then moved for summary judgment on the basis
that

the

transaction

and

facts by which

Defendant, Thompson,

claimed to have acquired the Chance Collar drill collars was the
identical transaction as in the LOR case and since the jury had
3

ruled that Defendant, Thompson, was not a good faith purchaser i
that transaction he was collaterally estopped from raising tha
issue in the present case.

The trial court granted the Motio

for Summary Judgment finding that (a) the issue in this cas
(Chance Collar) and the LOR case regarding Defendant's claim t
possession was the

same;

(b) the evidence

in the LOR cas

involved both the LOR and Chance Collar drill collars and showe<
a common fraudulent scheme and transaction;
ruled

against

Defendant,

Thompson,

(c) the jury ha<

regarding

his

claim

o

ownership of the drill collars; (d) the issue had been fully an<
fairly litigated and therefore, Chance Collar was entitled tc
possession of its drill collars. (R.214, Addendum 2)
B.

Statement of the Facts

The Statement of Facts will refer both to the transcript
from the LOR trial, which has been designated as part of the
record on appeal and the court record in the Chance Collar case.
References to the LOR transcript will be with a (T). References
to the court record in the Chance Collar case will be referred tc
by (R).
LOR
industry.

and

Chance
Their

equipment. (T.53)

Collar

business

are competitors
is

selling

and

in the

oilfield

renting

oilfield

Defendant, Thompson, owns a machine shop where

he repairs equipment and works as a machinist. (T.110)
On May 25, 1983 Lane Murray contacted LOR, Inc., with a
request to purchase drill collars. (T.10)
4

Drill collars are

oilfield equipment used to add weight to the drill bit- (T.9)
one

of his credit

references

Lane Murray

Defendant, Thompson. (T.10-11)

As

gave the name of

On August 3, 1983 Lane Murray

contacted Chance Collar Company and ordered drill collars, also
listing Defendant, Thompson, as one of his credit references.
(T.53-54)

Lane Murray and Defendant, Thompson, had adjoining

offices in Vernal, Utah.

(T.36)

Both LOR and Chance Collar

delivered the drill collars to that location and the collars were
put in a yard which was owned by Defendant, Thompson. (T.37, 55)
When Chance Collar and LOR did not receive payment for their
drill collars an investigation was started.

On September 6, 1983

Hugh Vogel, on behalf of Chance Collar, and Agee Spidle, on
behalf of LOR, attempted to locate Mr. Murray and the drill
collars. (T.38-39, 56-57)

They were unable to locate Mr. Murray.

Mr. Spidle located LOR's drill collars in a yard owned by Land
and Marine. (T.39)

The agent for Land and Marine informed Mr.

Spidle that Land and Marine was storing the drill collars for
Defendant, Thompson, because he claimed a lien for machine work
on the drill collars. (T.39)

Mr. Vogel and Mr. Spidle went to

Mr. Thompson's yard, met with his machinist and inquired as to
the location of the Chance Collar drill collars. (T.40, 56)

Mr.

Thompson's machinist said that the drill collars had been in the
yard the previous Friday, but must have been moved over the
weekend and he did not know where they had been moved. (T.40, 5657)

Mr. Spidle and Mr. Vogel then contacted Mr. Thompson and
5

inquired as to what interest he claimed in the drill collars, a
well as where they were located.

Mr. Thompson stated that he ha

been paid in full for the work he did on the LOR drill collar
and that he had no interest in the collars.

He also stated tha

he had jointed the Chance Collar collars, but he did not kno1
where the drill collars were, and that Lane Murray had them
(T.41, 58)

When the collars were eventually located they were ii

a yard owned by a friend of Defendant, Thompson, had been move<
there by Defendant (T.124-125) and had not been jointed. (T.59)
On

September

22,

located Lane Murray.

1983,

Dick

Werner,

on

behalf

of

LOR

Mr. Murray stated that he had just sold th(

drill collars and would be paid in two weeks.
disclose the name of the buyer.

(T.82)

He refused tc

Neither LOR or Chance

Collar have been able to locate Mr. Murray since that date.
LOR did not get paid and the drill collars remained at Lane
and Marine's yard.

On October

20, 1983 LOR

filed

a lawsuit

against Mr. Murray and obtained a Writ of Attachment attaching
the

drill

collars.

(R.182,

T.92)

Chance

Collar,

with

the

assistance of the FBI, located its drill collars in February of
1984.

(T.59)

After LOR attached its drill collars Defendant,

Thompson, on December 5, 1983, for the first time claimed that he
was the owner of both the LOR and Chance Collar drill collars.
(T.83, 166-167)
Defendant, Thompson,
been

stored

in his

yard.

admitted
(T.121)
6

that the

drill

collars had

and that he had the Chance

Collar drill collars moved to a friend's place, 20 miles from
Vernal,

(T.124-125) where the FBI located

them.

Defendant,

Thompson, claimed that he purchased both the LOR and the Chance
Collar drill collars from Lane Murray on August 8, 1983. (T.126)
He claimed he paid in excess of $94,000.00 for the collars.
(T.168-169)

He gave no valid explanation as to why he moved the

collars and denied ownership until December 5, 1983.
Thompson, claimed

he

paid

for both groups

Defendant,

of drill

collars

through a combination of trading machine work and a check for
$25,123.60 dated October 7, 1983. (T.135, 169-170)

Defendant,

Thompson's, records which he claimed supports this claim, had
invoices

out

of

sequence,

dates

changed

and

notations

in

different handwriting and ink color than the original part of the
invoice.

(T.89-90)

The check for $25,123.60 which Defendant

claimed paid for the drill collars had a notation stating "re:
gaskets, nuts and collars" (T.90) which writing was different
from the other writing on the check. (T.91)
In January, 1984 Defendant intervened in the LOR lawsuit.
(R.183, 186)

The LOR drill collars were sold, by stipulation of

the parties, with the money being held by
Complaint,

in

the

Chance

Collar

case,

was

the court.
amended

to

The
add

Defendant (R.21) and after a hearing, an injunction was entered
which prohibited Defendant from disposing of the drill collars.
(R.92)

In both cases Chance Collar and LOR claimed Defendant

used fraud to acquire the drill collars while he claimed to be a
7

good faith purchaser for value.
The LOR case was set for trial before a jury to begin Marc
26, 1985.

The Chance Collar case was set to follow immediatel

thereafter, before a jury beginning April 10, 1985.
trial

representatives

from

LOR, Chance

Collar

At the LQ

and

Defendan

testified regarding the transactions involving both sets of dril
collars. (T.32, 52, 67)

Defendant's claim as to how he acquire*

and paid for both sets of drill collars was identical and aros«
out of the same transaction.

The jury was instructed that «

party who acquires title to goods by fraud acquires voidable
title

and

that

the

seller

of

the

goods

can

rescind

th<

transaction and retake possession of the goods. (R.199-205)

Th<

jury was also instructed that a party having voidable title coulc
transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value and whal
was necessary to be a good faith purchaser. (R.205-207)

The jur}

was then instructed that if it found that Defendant, Thompson,
was a good faith purchaser he was entitled to the proceeds fron
the drill collars and damages, but if he was not a good faith
purchaser then LOR was entitled to the proceeds from its drill
collars.
Counsel, for both parties, addressed the jury on whether
Defendant acquired the drill collars by fraud or as a good faith
purchaser. (T.260-266, 278-282)

The jury returned its verdict

finding in favor of LOR and finding that Defendant, Thompson, was
not a good faith purchaser. (R.196)
8

Based on the jury verdict

the court then entered its Order finding LOR was entitled to the
proceeds from the sale of its drill collars and that Defendant,
Thompson's, claim was dismissed with prejudice. (R.197)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Defendant

claimed

that he

acquired

both

LOR's and

Chance Collar's drill collars as a good faith purchaser.

The

facts relating to his acquisition of both sets of drill collars
is identical.
facts

Both LOR and Chance Collar claimed that those

constituted

fraud

while

Defendant

showed he was a good faith purchaser.
issue to a jury in the LOR case.

claimed

those

facts

Defendant presented that

In the trial of the LOR case

the jury decided that the facts supported LOR and Chance Collar's
claims of fraud.

Defendant should be collaterally estopped from

relitigating that issue.
2.

Judge Richard C. Davidson presided at the LOR trial,

heard the witnesses testify, listened to argument by counsel and
also had certified copies of the pleadings, jury instructions and
verdict from the LOR case when he signed and entered the Summary
Judgment.

That information provided a substantial record on

which Judge Davidson based his decision.
objected

to

the

sufficiency

supplement the record.

of

the

The Defendant never

record

or

attempted

to

He should not be allowed to complain

about the record for the first time on appeal.
3.
arose

The Summary Judgment, based on collateral estoppel,

from

Defendant's

claim

of
9

how

he

acquired

the drill

collars. The time period involved was August through December o
1983. The Defendant's only defense to the Motion for Summar
Judgment was that there was a dispute as to the day in July, 198
when two telephone calls were made relating to credit.

The tria

court properly ruled that the telephone calls in July, 1983 wa
not material to the question of collateral estoppel, was no
relevant

to Defendant's

claim of how he

acquired

collars and did not preclude entry of Summary Judgment.

10

the dril

ARGUMENT
POINT I. DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM CLAIMING THAT HE IS
A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER OF THE CHANCE COLLAR DRILL
COLLARS BECAUSE A JURY HAS ALREADY RULED THAT HE
ACQUIRED THE COLLARS BY FRAUD.
The

issue in both the LOR and Chance Collar cases was

whether Defendant, Thompson, was a good faith purchaser of the
drill collars or acquired the same by fraud in concert with Lane
Murray.

The facts regarding Defendants acquisition of both sets

of drill collars was the same.
to Thompson's yard.

The drill collars were delivered

He then moved the collars to other yards. On

September 6, 1983, when contacted by representatives from LOR and
Chance Collar, he denied any claim to the drill collars. (T.3839)

It was not until December 5, 1983 when the LOR drill collars

had been seized pursuant to a Writ of Attachment that he claimed
to have purchased the drill collars. (T.83, 166)

His claim for

purchasing the drill collars was that he had acquired the drill
collars on August 8, 1983 from Lane Murray and that he paid for
them through a series of trading transactions. (T.12 6, 169-170)
Since the issues are the same, the facts are the same, the
Defendant is the same and the issues have been fully and fairly
litigated,

the

trial

court

acted

correcting

in ruling

that

Defendant, Thompson, was collaterally estopped from litigating
the issue a second time.
Collateral estoppel applies when; (1) the issue decided in a
prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the
action in question; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits;
11

(3) the party against whom the plea is asserted, is a party, o
in privity to the party, to the prior adjudication; and (4) th
issue was competently, fully and fairly litigated.

Copper Stat

Thrift and Loan vs. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah 1987), Wilde vs
Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P.2d 417

(Utah 1981), Searl

Brothers vs. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978).

The factual issu

that was decided in the prior action should be the same factua
issue

presented

essential

in the

second

action

and

that

issue must b<

to the resolution of the prior suit.

Copper Stat*

Thrift and Loan vs. Bruno, supra, Robertson vs. Campbell, 67P.2d

1226

(Utah 1983).

Collateral estoppel may be invoked b]

either the Plaintiff or the Defendant in the subsequent action
It is not necessary that the party asserting collateral estoppel
be a party to or in any way connected to the previous lawsuit,
The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be z
party or in privity to the party who lost the issue in the prioi
case.

Robertson

vs.

Campbell,

at

1230.

The

purpose

oi

collateral estoppel is to prevent relitigation of issues which e
party

has

already

litigated,

to

save

the

cost

lawsuits, and prevent inconsistent decisions.
Estate

vs. Monte Vista

Ranch, Inc., 758

P. 2d

of

multiple

Mel Trimble Real
451, 453

(Utah

1988) .
There is no question in this case that Defendant, Thompson,
is the same party whom the jury ruled against in the LOR case,
that the decision by the jury was final, on the merits and that
12

the

issue was completely,

fully and

fairly

litigated.

The

question raised by the Defendant is whether the issue was the
same in the LOR case and the Chance Collar case.

Several Utah

cases have considered that question and given guidance on making
that decision.
In Copper State Thrift and Loan vs. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387
(Utah 1987) Michael Bruno and Stephen Bruno signed as co-makers
on

a

Note.

Stephen

Bruno

filed

for

bankruptcy.

At

the

confirmation hearing in the Bankruptcy Court the Court found that
there was an agreement between Stephen Bruno and Copper State
Bank to accept the collateral as full satisfaction for the Note.
Copper State then sued Michael Bruno on the Note.

The Utah Court

of Appeals held that Copper State was collaterally estopped by
the decision rendered by the Bankruptcy Court.

The Court held

that the factual issue regarding payment of the Note was the same
and therefore, Copper State Bank was bound by the decision of the
Bankruptcy Court even as it related to Michael Bruno.
In Robertson vs. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983) a jury
ruled that a will was invalid because the signer of the will,
Marinus Johnson, had acted under undue influence.

The parties

then entered into a second lawsuit regarding the validity of a
trust executed by Marinus Johnson.

The Defendants, which had

been the losing parties in the will litigation, took the position
that collateral estoppel did not apply because it was a different
issue, arguing that the issue in the first case was the validity
13

of a will and the issue in the second case was the validity of
trust.

The court held

estopped.

that

the Defendants were

collaterall

In making that decision the court said:

The applicability of collateral estoppel does not
depend on whether the claims for relief are the same,
(citations omitted)
What is critical is whether the
issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was
essential to resolution of that suit and is the same
factual issue as that raised in a second suit.
The issue in the instant case which was previously
litigated
against the defendant is whether the
defendant exercised undue influence over the deceased
at the time of the making of the documents in question.
Id. at 1230.
In Biri-Newport, Inc. , vs. Leber, 739 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985
the court held collateral estoppel applied because the issue wai
whether there was a warranty for the goods.

The fact that th(

materials in question were delivered at different times and th<
party

against

whom

relief

was

sought

was

different

did

not

prevent application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

See

also, Wilde vs. Mid-Century Insurance Company, 635 P. 2d 417 (Utal:
1981) holding that the decision
feasor

for wages barred

in an action against a tort-

the parties

from raising a claim foi

wages against the provider of the no-fault insurance.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been applied wher
the issue is whether one is a bona fide purchaser or used bad
faith in acquiring title.

A prior decision on that issue was

held to be binding in a subsequent action.
Company, 276 S.E.2d 797 (W. Va. 1981).
14

Moore vs. Sun Lumber

The doctrine is also

applied in cases involving fraud.

In Imen vs. Glassford, 247

Cal. Rptr. 514, 201 Cal. App. 3d. 898 (1988) the court held that
a decision by the Real Estate Commissioner that the broker had
acted

fraudulently,

collaterally

estopped

him

against an action for fraud brought by his client.

from

defending

In Weiner vs.

Mitchell, Silberbercr and Knupp, 144 Cal. App. 3d 39, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 533 (1980) the court held that a conviction of securities
fraud barred the Defendant from denying his fraudulent conduct in
a subsequent civil action.
The critical factual issue in both the LOR and Chance Collar
cases is the same and is governed by the same set of facts. The
critical question is whether Defendant, Thompson, acquired the
drill collars as a good faith purchaser or whether he acquired
them through fraudulent conduct in concert with Lane Murray.
facts on that issue are the same.

The

The drill collars were ordered

by Lane Murray and delivered to the yard owned by Defendant,
Thompson. (T.37, 55)

When LOR and Chance Collar were not paid

for their drill collars, representatives for those companies, met
with Mr. Thompson on September 6, 1983. (T.38-39, 56-57)

At that

time he denied that he had any interest or ownership to the drill
collars and denied knowledge of their whereabouts. (T.41, 58)
Subsequently, at trial, Mr. Thompson admitted that he had both
sets of collars moved from his yard to other yards.

It was not

until December 6, 1983 that Mr. Thompson claimed that he owned
the drill collars. (T.83)

That occurred only after LOR had, by
15

court Order, attached its drill collars and Chance Collar ha
solicited

the

assistance

of

the

FBI

in

locating

its dril

collars.

Mr. Thompson then claimed that he acquired all of th

drill collars on August 8, 1983 from Lane Murray and that h
acquired both sets of drill collars through trading work with Mr
Murray. (T.135, 169)

As proof of his claim to both sets o

collars he submitted the same records which consisted of a fe
invoices and checks.

The invoice numbers and check numbers wer

out of sequence and did not support Mr. Thompson's version of th<
facts.

(T.89-91)

That

competently litigated.
and testified.

factual

issue was

fully,

fairly an<

Mr. Thompson was represented by counse

The jury ruled against him.

The issue has bee]

fully decided and Mr. Thompson should not be allowed to waste th(
court's time and litigate the issue again.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD A SUBSTANTIAL RECORD
FROM THE LOR CASE ON WHICH TO BASE ITS DECISION.
DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO OR SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT BE
PERMITTED TO CHALLENGE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RECORD
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Judge Davidson presided at the jury trial in the LOR case
and was very familiar with the testimony presented, the issues
raised, the argument of counsel, the instructions given to the
jury and the decision rendered by the jury.

A transcript of that

trial has been included as part of the record on this Appeal.

In

addition, Judge Davidson had certified copies of the Complaint,
the Answer to the Counterclaim, Verdict Form, Order and Judgment
on the Verdict and Jury Instructions from the LOR case prior to
his signing the Summary Judgment.
with the record on this Appeal.
record

from the LOR

granting

Summary

Those documents are included

Judge Davidson had a substantial

case on which to base his decision in

Judgment

in

this

case.

Additionally,

the

Defendant at no time claimed that the record was insufficient to
make a decision until the filing of his Brief on appeal.
Defendant, for the first time on appeal, claims that the
record

before the trial court, regarding

the LOR case, was

insufficient for the court to make a decision.
support that claim.

The jury verdict

rendered on March 27, 1985. (R.196)

The facts do not

in the LOR case was

The Order and Judgment based

on that decision was rendered April 3, 1985. (R.198)

The Motion

for Summary Judgment in the Chance Collar case was filed on March
29, 1985. On April 4, 1985 Defendant filed bankruptcy. (R.154) In
17

August, 1985 the stay was lifted and on August 22, 1985 Defendan
filed his reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant admitted

that the

In his repl

issue was the same, but as hi:

defense claimed that there were factual differences regardin<
when two telephone calls made in July of 1983. (R.161)

There wai

no claim made that the record was insufficient for the tria!
court to make a decision.
nor

furnish

Defendant did not file any Affidavil

other evidence to change his version of how h«

claimed to have acquired the drill collars. (R.158)

On Septembei

17, 1985 Chance Collar filed with the court certified copies oi
documents

from the

Complaint,

Answer

LOR
and

file.

Those documents

Counterclaim,

the

Verdict

included the
Form, Jur^

Instructions and Order and Judgment on the Verdict. (R.179)

Nc

objection to those documents was filed by the Defendant.

On

October

1,

1985

the

court

signed

and

entered

its

Summary

Judgment. (R.214)
The case of Mel Trimble Real Estate vs. Monte Vista Ranch,
Inc. , 758 P. 2d 451 (Utah 1988) discussed the question of what
documents are needed from the prior case to support a finding of
collateral estoppel.

In that particular case the only record of

the prior adjudication was a decision by the Supreme Court.

The

Plaintiff argued that the record was insufficient to support a
finding of collateral estoppel.
on two basis.

The court ruled against Trimble

The court first held that if Trimble believed more

of the record of the prior proceeding was necessary it was his
18

burden to produce additional documentation.

Secondly, the court

held that his claim should be rejected because the issue was
never raised before the trial court, but was raised for the first
time on appeal.

Mel Trimble at 455.

In the present case, the

record before Judge Davidson, included his having sat through a
two

(2) day trial

and heard the testimony

argument of counsel, instructed
decision.

the jury

of witnesses and

and

received

their

He had certified copies of the pleadings, the jury

instructions and the verdict form.
insufficient

he

documentation.

had

the

burden

If Defendant felt that was
to

provide

any

additional

Defendant, as in Mel Trimble, did not raise any

question regarding the sufficiency

or adequacy of the record

before the trial court, but raises that question for the first
time on appeal.

Therefore, his claim should also be denied on

that basis.
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POINT III. THE TIMING OF TWO TELEPHONE CALLS IN JULY
OF 1983 WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
DEFENDANT WAS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING TO BE
A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER OF THE DRILL COLLARS.
Defendant's argument that there are issues of fact regardin
the timing of two telephone calls in July of 1983 is not materia
to the issue in this case.

Defendant argued to the trial court

when opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment, that there was <
dispute regarding the timing of two telephone calls in July o
1983. (R.158, 161)

The trial court held that a contradiction o

dispute on those facts was not material to the issue that wa:
critical to decide the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The tria

court's ruling on that question was correct.
The issue before the trial court, on the Motion for Summary
Judgment, was whether the Defendant's claim of possession of the
drill collars in the Chance Collar case was the same issue as
that in the LOR case and whether the factual situation was the
same.

Defendant, in his Memorandum,

issue was the same.

(R.158) admitted that th€

He made no claim that the telephone calls

had any bearing on how he acquired the drill collars, but rather
related

to

credit

information

about

Lane

Murray.

The

facts

regarding the acquisition by Defendant of the drill collars is
the same in both cases.

Those facts are that the drill collars

were delivered to Thompson's yard, that he had the drill collars
moved and then in September denied any ownership or claim to the
drill collars.

It was not until December that he then claimed to

own the drill collars.

He then claimed to have acquired the
20

drill collars on August 8, 1983 through a series of trades.

The

records Defendant produced did not support that claim.

The

records, the transactions

and

claims by Defendant, Thompson,

regarding his acquiring title to the drill collars were identical
and the legal issue as to whether he was a good faith purchaser
or acquired the same through fraud was the same.

The timing of

two telephone calls regarding credit information was not related
to nor material to that issue.

21

CONCLUSION
Defendant has litigated and lost his claim that he was
good faith purchaser of the drill collars.
properly
issue.

in ruling

that

he was barred

The trial court acte
from

relitigating

The decision of the trial court should be sustained.

Respectfully submitted this 2L day of December, 1988.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys^/^or Plaintiff/
Respond*

Ti (0OL..O

:iark B. Allred
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM 1

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
The law requires good faith in every business transaction
id does not allow one to intentionally deceive another by false
^presentations.

Such is referred to as fraud.

To constitute

•aud a person must make a representation of fact which he knows
be untrue or else is recklessly made, intending to deceive
tother and the other person relies on the statement resulting in
.jury or loss.

0? vff^

*s

u\^

A <\

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
Good

faith means honesty

in fact and

the observance of

reasonable commerical standards of fair dealing in the trade.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

/£

A person who acquires title to goods by fraud has voidable
itle.

"Voidable Title" means the seller of the goods has the

Lght to rescind the transaction and to retake possession of the
Dods.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
It is an act of fraud to purchase or obtain goods with a
preconceived intention not to pay for them.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
A person who has voidable title has the power to transfer
)od title to a good faith purchaser for value.

If the person is

>t a good faith purchaser then he does not acquire good title
id the seller can retake possession of the goods.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
The Defendant, to qualify as a good faith purchaser, must
prove that he purchased the drill collars for value and without
notice of Plaintiff's claim to the drill collars.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

tf

In order to find in favor of Samuel C. Thompson, you must
ind from a preponderance the following:
(1)

that Samuel C. Thompson as a good faith purchaser#

urchased certain drill collars from the defendant, Lane Murray;
(2)

that plaintiff, Lor, Inc., attached the property (drill

ollars) and that Samuel C. Thompson was not able to use said
rill collars or otherwise sell or lease them from December 1,
983 to the date of the stipulated sale;
(3)

that plaintiff wrongfully caused the attachment of the

rill collars to issue; and
(4)

that the action of Lor, Inc. was wilfull and malicious

id done with intent to damage Samuel C. Thompson.

ADDENDUM 2

XARK B. ALLRED
ROBERT P. FAUST
flELSEN & SENIOR
attorneys for Plaintiff
63 East Main Street
ernal, Utah 84078
elephone: (801) 789-4908
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HANCE COLLAR COMPANY,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANE MURRAY dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN
ALES and SAMUEL C. THOMPSON,
Defendants.

Civil No. 12,352

The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to
laintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment which motion was based on
tie doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The Court having reviewed

he Motion

by both parties and the

Leadings

and Memoranda
and

documents

submitted
filed

herein, and

the

Court

having

resided at the trial of LOR, Inc. vs. Lane Murray dba Rocky
^untain Sales and Samuel C. Thompson, Civil No. 12,386, District
>urt, Uintah County and being familiar with the file and having
>ard the testimony and having examined the documents presented
: the trial of that case, and the Court having reviewed the
irtified copies from the LOR file and the Court being familiar
.th the issues raised in the LOR case and the verdict rendered
i that case, hereby finds as follows:

1.

The issues in the case of LOR, Inc. vs. Murray et al

related to the ownership of certain drill collars.

The issues

were whether Defendant, Thompson, had acquired title to the drill
collars as a good faith purchaser or had acquired

the drill

collars through fraud in concert with Defendant, Murray.
2.

The evidence presented in LOR, Inc. vs. Murray showed a

common scheme whereby Defendants, Murray and Thompson, acquired
both the LOR Inc. and the Chance Collar Company drill collars by
fraud.

Defendant, Thompson's claim for payment for both sets of

drill collars was based on the same set of transactions.
3.

At the conclusion of the LOR case, the jury ruled in

favor of LOR and against Defendant, Thompson.
4.

The issues in this case, Chance Collar Company vs.

Murray et al are identical to the issues adjudicated in LOR, Inc.
vs. Murray et al.
5.

The jury, after hearing the evidence, ruled against

Defendant, Thompson, in the LOR case finding he was not a good
faith purchaser but had acquired the drill collars by fraud.
Based on the jury verdict, a final judgment on the merits has
been entered.
6.

Defendant, Samuel C. Thompson, in the LOR case is the

same person as Samuel C. Thompson in this case.
7.

The issues presented in both the LOR case and this case

were completely, fully and fairly litigated at the trial of the
LOR case.

Both parties were represented by their lawyers and
2

vidence regarding both the LOR drill collars and the Chance
ollar Company drill collars was presented showing the common
raudulent

scheme

of

acquiring

the

drill

collars

by

the

efendants.
8.

The

affidavit

submitted

by

Defendant, Thompson, in

pposition to the Motion For Summary Judgment does not raise any
aterial

issues

of

fact

as

it

relates

to

the

defense

of

ollateral estoppel.
9.

Based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Plaintiff

s entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court being fully advised, and based on the findings of
lie Court, it is hereby;
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1.

Plaintiff's

Motion

For

Summary

Judgment

is

hereby

ranted.
2.

Plaintiff,

Chance

Collar

Company,

is

entitled

to

cimediate possession of the 12 slick drill collars, 9" O.D. x 2i"
,D. x
irsuant

31.6
to

ft. long blank
the

ended

preliminary

drill

injunction

ifendant, Thompson, is hereby

ordered

collars being
entered

to

herein

deliver

held
and

immediate

>ssession of the same to Plaintiff or its representatives and
le Sheriff of Uintah County, Utah is hereby ordered to assist
.aintiff in obtaining possession of those drill collars.

The

>nd posted by the Plaintiff as a condition of the preliminary
ijunction is hereby discharged.
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3.

The

counterclaim

of

Defendant,

Thompson,

against

Plaintiff is hereby dismissed.
4.

The issue as to any damages incurred by the Plaintiff

for two drill collars which were sold prior to entry of the
preliminary

injunction

is

hereby

reserved

together

with

the

question of costs•
DATED this

.' c7. A r
/

day of Soptombep, 1985.
;

J_

7 /

'

District Judge
Richard C. Davidson
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
Brief of the Plaintiff/Respondent, postage prepaid and addressed
this 1, day of December, 1988 to:
John C. Green
311 South State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

